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What Makes Negotiators Happy? 
The Differential Effects of Internal and External Social Comparisons on  
Negotiator Satisfaction 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the role of internal and external social comparisons in negotiator 
satisfaction. Internal comparisons involve another party to the negotiation (e.g. buyer 
compared to seller), while external comparisons focus on someone outside of the 
negotiation (e.g. buyer compared to other buyers). Negotiator satisfaction can influence a 
range of post-negotiation behavior, but relatively little is known about what makes 
negotiators more or less satisfied. In many contexts negotiators receive little objective 
feedback and lack benchmarks against which to judge their outcome. Prior work has 
modeled negotiator satisfaction as a function of utility maximization, expectancy 
disconfirmation and internal social comparisons (social utility). In this article we identify 
another particularly important driver of negotiator satisfaction, external social 
comparisons. Across five studies we demonstrate that external social comparisons affect 
satisfaction and that the effects of external social comparisons are qualitatively different 
from those of internal social comparisons. In particular, we find that downward external 
social comparisons increase satisfaction, while downward internal social comparisons 
decrease satisfaction. These results inform important prescriptions, and we discuss 
implications of these results for managing negotiator satisfaction. 
 
Key Words: Negotiation, Satisfaction, Social Comparison
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While some goods and services are exchanged in transparent markets at fixed market 
clearing prices, many other exchanges are characterized by a zone of indeterminacy 
(Rees, 1993) and involve negotiations. In these latter cases, people may have a poor sense 
of how good their outcome actually was (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996). Despite 
this uncertainty, negotiators assess their satisfaction with a negotiated outcome, and these 
satisfaction judgments have important implications for future behavior. For example, 
dissatisfied negotiators may be less likely to follow through on an agreement and less 
likely to negotiate with the same counterpart in the future (Barry & Oliver, 1996). 
 In this article we investigate the satisfaction process, and conceptualize negotiator 
satisfaction as a labile and manipulable construct. While prior work has identified a 
number of important determinants of negotiator satisfaction, we identify an important 
omission in this literature. Prior work has identified self-interested utility maximization 
(e.g., how low was the price I paid for the car), expectancy disconfirmation (e.g., how 
does the price I paid compare to the amount I expected to pay), and internal social 
comparisons (or social utility; e.g., how does the surplus I earned from this deal compare 
to the amount of surplus the seller earned from the deal) as important determinants of 
negotiator satisfaction. In this article we examine the role of external social comparisons 
(e.g. how does the price I paid compare to the price others in a similar situation paid) in 
satisfaction judgments. We demonstrate that external social comparisons significantly 
influence negotiator satisfaction, and that external social comparisons have independent 
and qualitatively different effects on satisfaction from internal social comparisons. 
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Negotiator Satisfaction 
While prior work has found that negotiators tend to be more satisfied when they 
earn higher outcomes (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000), negotiators often have 
difficulty evaluating their outcome. In many cases objective measures do not exist, and 
disputants lack information to guide their evaluation process (Hsee, 1996). Instead, 
negotiator satisfaction is likely to be heavily influenced by psychological factors. 
 Prior research has largely focused on two psychological determinants of 
satisfaction—expectancy disconfirmation and internal social comparisons. Oliver, 
Balakrishnan and Barry (1994) formalize an expectancy disconfirmation model of 
negotiator satisfaction. In their model, negotiators develop expectations prior to a 
negotiation and evaluate their outcome relative to these expectations. Consistent with 
their model, Oliver et al. (1994) find that the difference between negotiators’ expectations 
and outcomes is significantly correlated with negotiator satisfaction. These results are 
consistent with Conlon and Ross’ (1993) findings in a series of mediation studies. They 
find that negotiators who set lower expectations are more satisfied with their outcomes. 
In many cases, however, the link between expectations and satisfaction is likely to be 
complicated. Negotiators’ expectations shift during the negotiation process (Brett, 
Northcraft, & Pinkley, 1999), and negotiator expectations themselves can influence 
outcomes (White & Neale, 1994). 
 A second stream of satisfaction research involves internal social comparisons and 
considers the importance of evaluating one’s outcome relative to one’s counterpart’s 
outcome. Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989) refer to this construct as social 
utility, and they develop a model to predict satisfaction in a bargaining context. Across 
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three experiments they find support for their model that includes terms for the difference 
between one’s own outcome and one’s counterpart’s outcome.   
Internal versus External Social Comparison 
In this work we consider a different type of social comparison, external social 
comparison. External social comparisons are particularly important in situations that lack 
objective standards (Festinger, 1954), and consequently, we expect external social 
comparison judgments to play an important role in negotiator satisfaction. 
 In contrast to Loewenstein et al.’s (1989) focus on comparisons with others in the 
same negotiation, we consider the influence of comparisons with others outside of the 
negotiation. This distinction is important for several reasons. First, internal social 
comparisons and external social comparisons are conceptually distinct. These two types 
of comparisons focus attention in different ways, and we expect internal and external 
social comparisons to influence negotiator satisfaction very differently. Specifically, 
internal social comparisons focus attention on the part of the bargaining zone that the 
negotiator did not claim. While this focus alone may lower satisfaction, the tendency for 
negotiators to assume that they claimed most of the available surplus (Larrick & Wu, 
2003) might enhance the likelihood that an internal comparison will induce 
disappointment. As a result, we propose that internal social comparison values, even 
those that inform a negotiator that she captured most of the bargaining zone (i.e. 
downward comparisons), are likely to lower satisfaction.  
The proposition that even downward internal social comparison values may lower 
satisfaction is consistent with prior work that has found that negotiators tend to be less 
satisfied when they believe that they could have earned higher outcomes. For example, 
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Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and Medvec (2002) find that even when negotiators earned more 
surplus, they were less satisfied when their counterpart immediately accepted their first 
offer than when their counterpart did not immediately accept their first offer. In other 
work, Naquin (2003) finds that negotiators are less satisfied when their negotiation 
involves a large number of issues than when their negotiation involves a small number of 
issues, because negotiators are concerned that they will miss opportunities for increasing 
their surplus—a legitimate concern (Moran & Ritov, 2002; Pinkley, Griffith, and 
Northcraft, 1995).  
External social comparisons are less clearly related to forgone opportunities than 
are internal social comparisons. Therefore, we expect upward external social comparisons 
to decrease satisfaction and downward external social comparisons to increase 
satisfaction. 
Another difference between internal and external comparisons is that unlike 
external social comparisons, internal social comparisons confound relative performance 
with fairness. In fact, fairness considerations are an essential part of Loewenstein et al.’s 
(1989) framework, prompting them to use scenarios with equal surplus outcomes as the 
baseline case. In our studies we use the absence of comparison information as our control 
condition to examine the absolute influence of introducing comparison information.   
Study 1  
Our first study examines the influence of external social comparison values on 
negotiator satisfaction. Although prior work has identified a link between internal social 
comparison cues and satisfaction in scenario studies (Loewenstein et al., 1989), we 
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explore a different set of social comparison cues, external rather than internal social 
comparisons, in a different context, a negotiation exercise.  
In our study, participants experienced a number of factors in addition to external 
social comparison cues that are likely to influence their satisfaction. For example, 
participants’ satisfaction in our experiment may have been influenced by how much 
participants liked each other, how high or low their expectations were, the sequence of 
offers and counter-offers, persuasive arguments, and even their own affective states. 
Taken together, these factors may compete with or even overwhelm the effects of 
external social comparisons.  
Method 
A sample of 354 undergraduate and MBA students completed an in-class exercise 
on the first day of class. Participants read background information regarding the sale of a 
used truck. Participants were randomly paired and assigned to the role of either buyer or 
seller. Buyers had private information regarding an alternative truck they could purchase 
for $5500, and sellers had private information regarding an alternative buyer who would 
be willing to purchase the truck for $3500. Participants bargained in pairs until they 
reached an agreement, decided they could not reach an agreement, or reached the set time 
limit (of 40 minutes). 
After completing the exercise, groups of participants were exposed to an external 
social comparison manipulation. We randomly assigned groups of approximately 20 
dyads to be exposed to either a high or a low external social referent. The experimenter 
asked one pair in each experimental session to reveal their final price. In the high external 
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social referent condition, that pair had reached an agreement of $55001. In the low 
external social referent condition, the group was exposed to an agreement of $4500. 
Participants were led to believe that the experimenters had forgotten to distribute the 
post-negotiation survey and had mistakenly started the debriefing. Immediately following 
this manipulation, and before any further discussion of the exercise, participants 
completed a survey that contained our primary dependent measures. All participants were 
asked, “How satisfied are you with your outcome from this negotiation?” and “How 
satisfied are you with the negotiation process?” Each question was asked with an 11-
point scale ranging from extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied. Then as a 
manipulation check, they judged how well their outcome compares to outcomes of others 
in the same role. Buyers were asked how their outcome compares to other buyers’ 
outcomes and sellers were asked to compare their outcome to other sellers. The 11-point 
response scale ranged from worst in the class to best in the class. 
Results 
A total of 316 participants reached an agreement within the allotted time and 
completed all dependent measures. Final prices ranged from $3500 to $5500 with a mean 
of $4746 and a standard deviation of $508. Outcome and process satisfaction were highly 
correlated (r = .62 for buyers, p <. 001; r = .64 for sellers, p < .001) and separate analyses 
of outcome satisfaction and process satisfaction produced similar patterns of results. In 
the analyses that follow, we used an overall measure of satisfaction: the sum of outcome 
and process satisfaction. 
                                                 
1 Since one experimental session did not include a dyad who reached an agreement at $5500, we used an 
agreement of $5250 in that session. 
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As depicted in Figure 1, our external social comparison cues significantly 
influenced social comparison judgments. Buyers exposed to the high external social 
referent judged that they had performed relatively better than buyers exposed to the low 
external social referent, (µ = 5.6 versus µ = 4.8, t (151) = 3.37, p < .001). As expected, 
this pattern was reversed for sellers. Sellers exposed to the low external social referent 
thought they had performed relatively better than sellers exposed to the high external 
social referent, (µ = 5.9 versus µ = 4.9, t (145) = 3.97, p < .001).  
More importantly, the external social comparison manipulation influenced 
participants’ satisfaction (see Figure 2). As expected, buyers in the high external social 
referent condition were more satisfied than buyers in the low external social referent 
condition, (µ = 12.9 versus µ = 11.8, t (152) = 1.89, p < .05), and sellers in the low 
external social referent condition were more satisfied than sellers in the high external 
social referent condition, (µ = 12.9 versus µ = 11.8, t (145) = 1.95, p < .05).  
Discussion 
These results identify a causal link between external social comparison cues and 
satisfaction. Incidental social comparison cues had a dramatic effect on satisfaction 
despite all the other information available in the negotiation context. Like car buyers in a 
dealership, participants in our experiment had a prolonged interaction including 
discussion, an exchange of offers, and both verbal and non-verbal reactions to each 
other’s offers. All of these cues could have affected their negotiation satisfaction. Even 
with these competing cues, however, we find that external social comparison values have 
a substantial effect on satisfaction. In practice, a number of factors are likely to moderate 
the relationship between external social comparison cues and satisfaction. For example, 
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Goethals and Darley (1977) suggest that social comparison effects can be moderated by 
the relationship between the referent and the perceiver, the relative status of the referent 
and the perceived competency the referent.  
Study 2 
In our second study we examine the influence of external social comparison 
information relative to other determinants of satisfaction. Unlike Study 1, we do not 
focus participants’ attention on external social comparison cues. Instead, we examine the 
influence of self-constructed external and internal social comparisons on negotiator 
satisfaction. Unlike previous experimental studies of social comparison in negotiations, 
our design enables us to assess the relative contribution of different drivers of satisfaction 
in a more natural context where attention is not artificially drawn to social comparisons. 
To assess the relative influence of different drivers of satisfaction we compare 
four alternative models of negotiator satisfaction. We derive the first three models from 
prior research: an objective utility model, a social utility model, and an expectancy 
disconfirmation model. We develop the fourth model to represent the role of external 
social comparison judgments in satisfaction.  
Method 
A total of 188 graduate and undergraduate business students participated in a 
bargaining exercise on the first day of a negotiation class. They participated in the same 
bargaining exercise used in Study 1. After participants read their background 
information, but before they bargained, participants were asked to predict the price they 
were most likely to agree on with their partner (Oliver, Balakrishnan, and Barry, 1994). 
Participants then bargained in pairs until they reached an agreement, decided they could 
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not reach an agreement, or reached the set time limit (of 40 minutes). After the 
bargaining session all participants responded to a post-bargaining questionnaire. This 
questionnaire asked participants to judge their satisfaction with their outcome (from 
extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied), their satisfaction with the bargaining 
process (using the same satisfaction scale as the one we used in Study 1), and how well 
they thought their outcome compared to other participants in their same role (from much 
better than others to much worse than others). They were also asked to estimate their 
partner’s reservation price. Sellers were asked to estimate the highest price their buyer 
would pay and buyers were asked to estimate the lowest price their seller would accept. 
Results 
A total of 156 participants reached an agreement and completed all dependent 
measures. Final prices ranged from $3600 to $5800, with a mean of $4850 and standard 
deviation of $516. As in Study 1, we summed outcome and process satisfaction (r = .48 
for buyers, p <. 001; r = .62 for sellers, p < .001) to produce one overall measure of 
satisfaction.  
In this study we focus on the effects of objective outcomes, social utility, 
expectancy disconfirmation, and external social comparison on satisfaction. Consistent 
with this approach we develop and compare four alternative models of satisfaction. To 
help gauge the performance of these models, we introduce a combined model that 
includes all the factors used in the four models of interest. We describe each of these 
models in turn. 
Objective Utility Model. We derive the first model from classical economics 
which posits a relationship between the objective measure of price and satisfaction. We 
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include a quadratic term in our model to allow for diminishing marginal utility. The 
objective utility model is represented in Equation 1. 
(1)    SatisfactionOU  = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2 
+ constant 
 
Social Utility Model. The second model draws on the work of Loewenstein et al. 
(1989). They find that satisfaction is a function not only of how much money an 
individual receives, but also of how much money one’s counterpart receives. In our 
framework these are internal comparisons, and we refer to the class of models that use 
internal comparisons to predict satisfaction as social utility models. Loewenstein et al. 
(1989) investigate a business negotiation context similar to our negotiation context. In 
that setting they find that a model that includes both linear and quadratic terms for one’s 
own outcome and for one’s partner’s outcome offers the best fit for predicting 
satisfaction.  
In the Loewenstein et al. (1989) studies, participants were told how much they 
and their hypothetical partners received beyond their respective reservation prices. In the 
present study, participants actually negotiated with a partner and were not told their 
partner’s reservation price. This mimics many actual negotiations where negotiators are 
never told their partner’s reservation price. As a result, participants in this study cannot 
directly compute their counterpart’s surplus. Instead, we asked participants to estimate 
their counterpart’s reservation price, and subtracted this value from the final price to 
compute perceived partner’s surplus. Our social utility model is depicted in Equation 2. 
(2)    SatisfactionSU = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2      
+ β3 (perceived partner’s surplus) + β4 (perceived partner’s surplus)2
+ constant 
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Expectancy Disconfirmation Model. We borrow the expectancy disconfirmation 
model from research conducted by Oliver et al. (1994). They find that satisfaction with 
negotiated outcomes is a function of an individual’s profit and of the difference between 
one’s actual outcome and one’s expected outcome. In the present study, each participant 
was asked to predict the most likely outcome of the negotiation before the bargaining 
session began. We use the difference between this prediction and the actual outcome to 
measure expectancy disconfirmation (see equation 3). 
(3)     SatisfactionED = β1 (objective outcome)    
+ β2 (expectancy disconfirmation) 
+ constant  
 
External Social Comparison Model. We measure external social comparison with 
a question asking participants how well they think their outcome compares to the 
outcomes of others in their same role. This measure is the only predictor used in the 
external social comparison model. This model is represented in Equation 4. 
(4)               SatisfactionSC = β1 (social comparison)      
+ constant
 
Combined Model. This model, depicted in Equation 5, includes all predictors 
from the four models above. It provides a benchmark to evaluate the performance of our 
four models.  
(5)   Satisfaction = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2  
+ β3 (partner’s surplus) + β4 (partner’s surplus)2
+ β5 (expectancy disconfirmation) 
+ β6 (social comparison) 
+ constant 
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We fit each model separately for buyers and sellers, and report the results in Table 
1. As expected, several models explain statistically significant amounts of variance in 
satisfaction, and we describe results from each of these models in turn. The first model in 
Table 1 is the objective utility model. Consistent with increasing utility and declining 
marginal utility, for both buyers and sellers the parameter estimates for objective 
outcome were positive, and the parameter estimates for the quadratic term were negative. 
The utility parameters, however, were not significant for either buyers or sellers2, and 
overall, the objective utility model was significant for sellers, but not for buyers. The 
variance accounted for by the objective utility model was significantly less than the 
combined model (F (4,63) = 5.34, p < .001 for buyers; F (4,67) = 3.64, p < .01 for 
sellers). 
The second model in Table 1 is the social utility model. As expected, the 
parameter estimates for partner’s outcome were negative for both buyers and sellers. The 
higher a counterpart’s perceived surplus, the less satisfied participants were. This result 
was statistically significant for sellers, but not buyers. For sellers, we also found 
diminishing marginal disutility for larger partner outcomes. Overall, the social utility 
model accounted for a statistically significant portion of satisfaction variance for sellers, 
but not buyers. The social utility model for sellers captured marginally less variance than 
the combined model (F (2,67) = 3.05, p = .054). The social utility model for buyers 
captured significantly less variance than the combined model (F (2,63) = 8.35, p < .001).  
The third model shown in Table 1 is the expectancy disconfirmation model. This 
model identifies a positive relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and 
                                                 
2 For sellers’ satisfaction, the linear term becomes significant if the quadratic term is removed, suggesting 
that there is some reliable linear effect of objective outcome.  
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satisfaction. The more participants’ outcomes exceeded their expectations, the more 
satisfied they were. This relationship was significant for buyers, but not for sellers. The 
expectancy disconfirmation model for both buyers and sellers accounted for significantly 
less variance than the combined model (F (4,63) = 3.60, p < .05 for buyers; F (4,67) = 
3.64, p < .01 for sellers). 
For both buyers and sellers the external social comparison parameters were in the 
predicted direction and statistically significant. Both groups were more satisfied the better 
they thought their outcome compared to the outcomes of others in their same role. In 
addition, these models explained a high proportion of variance in satisfaction. In fact, the 
variance captured by the social comparison model was not significantly different from the 
variance captured by the combined model for buyers (F (5,63) < 1) or sellers (F (5,67) = 
1.35, ns).  
 Looking at the coefficient estimates for the combined model, we see that the 
external social comparison variables remain highly significant predictors of satisfaction 
controlling for factors identified in previous research. In fact, this is the only parameter 
that is statistically significant for both buyers and sellers in the combined model.  
Discussion 
Results from this study suggest that external social comparison is a key 
determinant of negotiator satisfaction. In fact, in this study once external social 
comparison values were included in the model, other factors, such as expectations, social 
utility, and even the agreed price, accounted for very little of the variance in satisfaction. 
Both buyers and sellers were more satisfied when they thought that others in their 
position had received less than they had. It is important to note that in this study 
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participants were not provided with information about how well others had actually 
performed. As a result, participants in this study constructed social comparisons in the 
absence of any immediately available comparison information (e.g. Suls, Marco, and 
Tobin 1991; Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman 1985), so our findings may offer a 
conservative test of the importance of external social comparison. If participants had 
received information about others’ outcomes, the social comparison model may have 
accounted for an even larger proportion of the variance. 
Our results also provide some support for the social utility (Loewenstein et al. 
1989) and expectancy disconfirmation (Oliver et al. 1994) accounts of satisfaction. 
Consistent with the social utility prediction, sellers were more satisfied when they 
perceived that their counterpart earned less surplus. Supporting the expectancy 
disconfirmation account, we found that buyers were more satisfied when the final price 
they actually agreed to was low compared to the price they expected to pay ex-ante. For 
both buyers and sellers, however, social comparison judgments were the most reliable 
predictor of satisfaction. 
Surprisingly, the objective outcome model captured little variance, particularly for 
buyers. That is, buyers’ and sellers’ satisfaction did not vary much with changes in the 
agreed price. Although economic theory suggests that objective prices should dominate 
uninformed social comparisons, we find the reverse pattern of effects. Our results may be 
better understood by considering the notion of evaluability introduced by Hsee (1996). 
Some information (e.g. prices) can be difficult to evaluate in some contexts and easy to 
evaluate in other contexts. In this experiment, price information may have been difficult 
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to evaluate. In Study 5, we examine social comparison effects while manipulating the 
evaluability of the negotiated price.  
Study 3 
 In study three we extend our investigation to examine the mechanics of external 
social comparisons. In this study we manipulate both internal and external social 
comparison values, and we measure the individual and joint effects of internal and 
external social comparison cues. This aspect of our design enables us to test the 
hypothesis that downward external social comparison values increase negotiator 
satisfaction more than downward internal social comparison values. 
In this study we also examine the absolute effect of social comparison cues by 
comparing to a condition with no social comparison information. This aspect of our 
design is different from prior work (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 1989), and results from this 
study can inform the basic decision of whether or not to reveal social comparison 
information.  
Method
 
A total of 265 respondents from a large Northeast train station read and answered 
questions about a scenario that described the purchase of a rare coin. Each respondent 
read one of nine versions from a 3 (external social comparison: high, low or none) x 3 
(internal social comparison: high, low, or none) factorial design. Across all versions, 
participants were informed that they purchased the coin for $80 and that they would have 
paid any amount up to $110. That is, across all versions participants earned a surplus of 
$30. We manipulated external social comparisons by mentioning a friend who had either 
paid more or less than they had for a similar coin. The friend’s surplus was either $10, 
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$50 or unspecified. We manipulated internal social comparisons by providing 
information about the lowest price for which the seller would have been willing to sell 
the coin. Across conditions, the seller’s surplus was either $10, $50, or unspecified.  
Each respondent saw only one version of the scenario, shown below. 
Imagine that after traveling with a good friend last summer, you both developed 
an interest in old coins. You purchased a couple of old coins during your trip, and you 
are interested in expanding your small collection.  
One day, you happen to walk by a local antique show. While looking through a 
few items, you come across a table with old coins. The seller recently inherited the coins, 
and he is hoping to make some money. One of the coins catches your eye. It is an old 
American coin in excellent condition. You decide to purchase the coin if you can get it for 
any amount below $110. You start to bargain with the seller, and after a few minutes you 
agree to pay $80. [You find out after you make your purchase that the seller would have 
sold the coin for any amount over $70/$30.] 
As you continue walking through the antique show you happen to run into your 
friend. You begin to tell your friend about your recent purchase, and it turns out he had 
also just bought an old coin, from a different seller. You compare the two coins and find 
that they are very similar. In fact, both coins have the same design, are the same age and 
both are in excellent condition. [Your friend paid $100/$60 for his coin.] 
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked how satisfied they would be 
with their purchase on a 9-point scale ranging from “not at all satisfied” to “extremely 
satisfied.” They were then asked to estimate the value (in dollars) of the coin. 
Results 
 19
In an ANOVA model predicting satisfaction, we found significant main effects 
for both internal (F(2, 256) =30.7, p < .001) and external social comparison values (F(2, 
256) = 21.0, p < .001), and a significant interaction (F(4, 256) = 4.89, p < .001). As 
depicted in Table 2, internal and external social comparisons had very different effects on 
satisfaction. For internal social comparisons, both upward and downward internal social 
comparisons decreased satisfaction (Ms = 3.10 and 4.73, respectively) relative to no 
internal social comparison information (M = 5.68, t (56) = 4.88, p < .001, t(56) = 1.77, 
p=.083). For external comparisons, however, the pattern is very different. Upward 
external comparisons reduced satisfaction (4.41 versus 5.68, t(55) = 2.40, p < .05), but 
downward external comparison information markedly increased satisfaction (7.31 versus 
5.68, t(55) = 3.23, p < .005).  Upward comparisons with an external referent produced 
significantly higher satisfaction than upward comparisons with an internal referent ( 7.31 
versus 4.73, t(57) = 5.63, p < .001). 
We also find an interesting interaction between internal and external social 
comparisons. External social comparisons influenced satisfaction more when the internal 
social comparison was downward (6.63 vs. 4.17) than when the internal social 
comparison was upward (3.83 vs. 3.80). Similarly, internal social comparisons influenced 
satisfaction more when the external social comparison was downward (6.63 vs. 3.83) 
than when the external social comparison was upward (4.73 vs. 3.80).  It seems that one 
unfavorable comparison dampens the effect of any other comparison. 
Importantly, we find different effects for downward internal and external social 
comparisons. Downward external comparisons increased satisfaction, while downward 
internal comparisons decreased satisfaction. One possible explanation for this asymmetric 
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effect is that internal and external social comparisons influence perceptions of value 
differently. After all, by construction, the lowest price at which the seller would sell is 
lower than the price the buyer paid, while the price a friend paid could be higher or lower 
than the price paid by the buyer.  
To test whether the social comparison effects we observe in this study influence 
satisfaction by simply changing perceptions of value, we added perceived value as a 
covariate in our ANOVA. In this model we find that perceived value is a significant 
predictor of satisfaction (F (2, 255) = 111, p < .001), but the main effects and interaction 
of social comparisons remain significant (Fs > 5, ps < .005). To test for the effects of 
social comparison beyond influencing perceptions of value, we ran a regression 
predicting satisfaction from perceived value and four dummy variables corresponding to 
the effects of upward and downward internal and external social comparisons. We find 
that the same social comparison effects remain significant after controlling for perceived 
value: upward and downward internal comparisons lower satisfaction, upward external 
comparisons lower satisfaction, and downward external comparisons raise satisfaction.  
Discussion 
 In this study, we manipulated both types of social comparisons, and we find that 
both significantly influence negotiator satisfaction. When we control for changes in 
perceptions of value, we still find significant effects of internal and external social 
comparisons on satisfaction.  
Results from this study also reveal qualitative differences between internal and 
external social comparisons. The key difference between internal and external social 
comparison values is in the effect of downward comparison values. Compared to a base-
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line case of no social comparison information, we find that downward external social 
comparison cues increase satisfaction, while downward internal comparison cues 
decrease satisfaction.  
Before running this study, we were not sure whether negotiators would be more or 
less satisfied upon learning that they had come close to their participant’s reservation 
price. One might imagine several possible reactions to downward internal comparisons: 
(1) satisfaction with claiming most of the total surplus (i.e., I am glad I got so close to my 
partner’s reservation price), (2) dissatisfaction with advantageous inequity (i.e., I feel 
badly that my partner did not earn as much as I did), or (3) dissatisfaction upon learning 
of forgone opportunities to claim additional surplus (i.e., I wish I had gotten even closer 
to my partner’s reservation price). Results from Study 3 are consistent with the second 
and third reactions, but are not consistent with the first. In our next study we test whether 
the second or the third reaction is responsible for dissatisfaction following downward 
internal social comparisons.  
Study 4 
In Study 3 we demonstrate an important asymmetry between the effects of 
internal and external social comparisons. In this study we explore this asymmetry and 
investigate two possible mechanisms for this effect. First, we consider the possibility that 
downward internal social comparisons harm satisfaction because they generate feelings 
of inequality (Loewenstein et al. 1989). That is, negotiators exposed to downward 
internal social comparison cues may be dissatisfied because they value equality and 
dislike unequal outcomes. If this is true, negotiator satisfaction should be greater when a 
counterpart’s surplus is higher and closer to one’s own outcome. 
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Alternatively, negotiators may be dissatisfied by downward internal social 
comparisons because any mention of their partner’s surplus raises the prospect that they 
could have earned even more surplus for themselves. If this is true, then satisfaction 
should decrease as one’s counterpart’s surplus is closer to one’s own outcome.  
Method 
 We recruited 155 undergraduate students from a Northeastern university to 
complete one of six versions of a survey. We modified the materials used in Study 3 to 
create six versions in a 2 (External social comparison: Downward or No information) x 3 
(Internal social comparison: Equal, Small surplus, or No surplus) design. As in Study 3, 
across all versions participants earned a surplus of $30. We manipulated external social 
comparisons by mentioning a friend who had either paid more than they had ($10 
surplus) or by providing no information about the friend’s purchase price. We 
manipulated internal social comparisons by providing information about the price for 
which the seller would have been willing to sell the coin. Across conditions, the seller’s 
surplus was either $30 (Equal condition), $10 (Small surplus), or $0 (No surplus). 
Each respondent saw only one version of the materials. After reading the scenario, 
respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied they were with the purchase using the 
same scale as Study 3. 
Results
We analyzed satisfaction scores using a 2x3 ANOVA (see Table 3). Both main 
effects were highly significant (Internal – F(2,145) = 58.4, p < .001; External – F(1,145) 
= 41.0, p < .001), and there was no significant interaction (F < 1). The key result in this 
study is the main effect of internal social comparison on satisfaction. As the inequality 
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between the outcomes grew, satisfaction increased. Respondents were most satisfied 
when their counterpart earned no surplus (M = 6.87), significantly less satisfied when 
their counterpart earned a small surplus ($10; M = 6.08, t(99) = 2.51, p < .02), and even 
less satisfied when their counterpart earned an equal surplus ($30; M = 3.62, t(98) = 7.26, 
p < .001). Replicating results from Study 3, we find that participants were more satisfied 
with a downward external comparison (M = 6.38) than with no external social 
comparison information (M = 4.70).  
Discussion 
 Results from this study do not support an equality-based explanation for the 
relationship between social comparisons and satisfaction. Specifically, we find that 
participants were more satisfied the greater the gap between their surplus and their 
partner’s surplus. This finding suggests that downward internal social comparisons can 
harm negotiator satisfaction by highlighting missed opportunities to increase one’s 
surplus.  
 More broadly, results from this work highlight conceptual and practical 
differences between internal and external social comparisons. Unlike external social 
comparisons, both upward and downward internal social comparisons can decrease 
negotiator satisfaction. 
 This work, however, does not address an important question about the practical 
implications of social comparison information. In our previous studies, participants 
evaluated outcomes in the absence of objective benchmarks. Social comparison 
information may influence satisfaction very differently when individuals have objective 
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standards with which to evaluate their outcome. We investigate this issue in our next 
study. 
Study 5 
In our previous studies, participants’ outcomes were difficult to evaluate. In these 
settings, social comparison information may have been particularly influential because 
participants lacked objective benchmarks. In this study, we manipulate outcome 
evaluability and we measure changes in the influence of external social comparisons on 
satisfaction. 
In many situations, negotiated outcomes are difficult to evaluate. For example, the 
range of appropriate prices for a used car or appropriate discounts for last season’s 
fashions are characterized by large zones of indeterminacy (Rees, 1993). In most cases, 
objective information (e.g., the book value of a used car or information about prior 
discounts) can make negotiated outcomes easier to evaluate. 
Social comparisons may influence satisfaction, in part, by changing perceptions of 
value. As a result, we expect social comparison information to influence satisfaction 
more when the situation has low evaluability than when it has high evaluability. 
However, results from Study 3 revealed that social comparison affects satisfaction above 
and beyond its effects on the perceived value of the deal. Consequently, we suspect that 
even in high evaluability situations, social comparison information will affect 
satisfaction. In this study, we explore this proposition. 
Method 
A total of 202 passengers waiting at a Northeast airport were recruited to 
participate in this study. We used methods similar to those we used in Studies 3 and 4. 
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Participants read a scenario about the purchase of a rare coin. Each respondent saw one 
version from a 2 (External social comparison: high or low) x 3 (Appraisal value: high, 
low, or none) factorial design. We manipulated external social comparison by mentioning 
that a friend had either paid more or less for a similar coin. We manipulated appraisal 
value by mentioning that an expert appraiser had either valued the coin at more than they 
had paid, valued the coin at less than they had paid, or did not appraise the coin. We 
appended the following paragraph to the end of the scenario we used in our previous 
studies: 
Many antique shows sponsor appraisal tables. At this antique show the appraisal 
table includes professional appraisers, and one of them is an expert in antique coins. You 
decide to have your coin appraised by the coin specialist. [After a careful inspection, the 
appraiser tells you that your coin is probably worth $120. OR After a careful inspection, 
the appraiser tells you that your coin is probably worth $45. OR The line for the coin 
appraiser, however, was quite long so you decided not to wait for an appraisal.] 
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked how satisfied they would be 
with their purchase using the same scale as the previous two studies.  
Results 
We analyzed satisfaction scores using a 2x3 ANOVA with social comparison and 
appraisal as independent factors. Both main effects were significant (F (1,195) = 43.3, p 
< .001 for external social comparison, F (2,195) = 84.1, p < .001 for appraisal). 
Respondents who were informed that their friend paid less were less satisfied (µ = 3.92) 
than those who were informed that their friend paid more (µ = 5.48). Respondents in the 
high appraisal condition were more satisfied (µ = 6.62) than those in the no appraisal 
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condition (µ = 4.67), and those in the no appraisal condition were more satisfied than 
those in the low appraisal condition (µ = 2.88). Supporting our thesis, these main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction (F (2,195) = 7.40, p < .001). As depicted in 
Figure 3, social comparison information had the largest effect on satisfaction when no 
appraisal was given (µ = 3.31 versus µ = 5.94, t (64) = 7.00, p < .001). This effect was 
significantly larger than the effect with a low appraisal (F (1,130) = 13.2, p < .001) and 
significantly larger than the effect with a high appraisal (F (1,129) = 3.90, p < .05).  
The high appraisal condition showed a greater effect of social comparison 
information than the low appraisal condition (F (1,131) = 4.01, p < .05). Importantly, the 
effect of social comparison in the high appraisal condition was significant (µ = 5.80 
versus µ = 7.41, t (65) = 4.53, p < .001), while in the low appraisal condition there was 
no significant effect of social comparison information (µ = 2.68 versus µ = 3.09, t < 1). 
Discussion 
As predicted, the influence of external social comparison information was greater 
when there was no appraisal than when there was an appraisal. This result supports the 
proposition that the evaluability of an outcome moderates the influence of social 
comparison information on satisfaction. However, we still find that social comparison 
information matters when objective information is evaluable and positive. In this case, 
social comparison information influenced satisfaction despite the presence of objective 
information. 
We also found that social comparison information did not significantly influence 
satisfaction when objective information was evaluable and negative. This result suggests 
that social comparison information may depress satisfaction with a deal that is known to 
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be good more easily than it can increase satisfaction with a deal that is known to be bad. 
This asymmetry parallels the asymmetry found in Study 3, whereby adding information 
to a situation where there is already a negative impression of the negotiated outcome had 
little effect, while adding the same information when there is a positive impression has a 
substantial effect.   
General Discussion 
 In this paper we examine the influence of social comparisons on negotiator 
satisfaction. We make a conceptual distinction between internal social comparisons, 
comparisons made with a negotiation counterpart (e.g., a buyer comparing his surplus to 
the seller’s surplus), and external social comparisons, comparisons with negotiators in 
similar situations outside of one’s own negotiation (e.g., a car buyer comparing his 
surplus to the surplus of another buyer purchasing a similar car). Across five studies we 
demonstrate that the effects of internal and external social comparisons on satisfaction are 
qualitatively different. In particular, while downward external social comparisons 
increase negotiator satisfaction, similar downward internal social comparisons decrease 
negotiator satisfaction. This may happen because even downward internal social 
comparison values focus negotiator’s attention on missed opportunities to claim 
additional surplus.  
 Our distinction between internal and external social comparisons also has 
practical implications. First, the set of available external comparison values is typically 
very different from the set of available internal comparison values. For example, a car 
salesperson who has just concluded a negotiation with a buyer has a relatively 
constrained set of internal social comparisons from which to choose. The seller could 
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either conceal or reveal her surplus (or possibly misrepresent her surplus). With respect to 
external social comparisons, however, the seller has the option of selecting from a 
number of prior negotiation outcomes. In this case, the seller has a much broader set of 
external social comparison alternatives than internal social comparison alternatives, and 
her ability to identify a credible downward external social comparison is greater than her 
ability to identify a downward internal social comparison.  
Internal and external social comparisons are also very different with respect to the 
type of information they convey. Specifically, unlike external social comparison values, 
internal social comparison values convey information that is explicit about missed 
opportunities to claim additional surplus. Consistent with our findings, this difference 
suggests that internal social comparisons will be more likely to lower satisfaction than 
external social comparisons. 
More broadly, results from our work demonstrate that satisfaction judgments are 
very labile and subject to manipulation. Both internal social comparisons and external 
social comparisons are key drivers of satisfaction, and prescriptively, negotiators should 
recognize that the satisfaction their counterparts derive from a negotiation may have less 
to do with the actual concessions they make (e.g. objective profit) than the comparison 
information they provide. In our studies we find that the effects of social comparisons on 
satisfaction are not mediated by value. That is, negotiators have preferences for 
outperforming others that are separate from their preference for the value of the outcome 
itself. 
A number of factors are likely to moderate the importance of social comparisons 
on satisfaction. For example, in Study 5 we found that evaluability moderates the 
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influence of social comparison information on satisfaction. Social comparison 
information matters most in cases where outcomes are difficult to evaluate or objective 
information is favorable. Future research should explore the effects of evaluability on 
satisfaction more broadly, and consider a number of other individual and contextual 
factors that are likely to moderate the influence of social comparison information on 
negotiator satisfaction. For example, future work could consider the importance of a 
negotiator’s relationship with his or her partner, a negotiator’s level of experience with 
the particular negotiation situation, a negotiator’s emotional state, and the interplay 
between social comparison information and other aspects of the negotiation process (e.g., 
Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000; Schweitzer & Gomberg, 2001). 
In addition, future research should explore the selection and construction of 
comparisons. In experimental studies social comparison values are often provided (e.g., 
De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, 1994; Messick & Sentis, 1985; Ordonez, Connolly, & 
Coughlan, 2000). In many settings, however, social comparison values are generated or 
selected by the negotiator. In some cases, individuals may select from multiple social 
comparison values or even generate social comparison judgments in the absence of 
comparison information. For example, people may develop a sense of how others would 
perform and construct a social comparison judgment grounded in assumptions about their 
own negotiation skill relative to others. Perhaps, in the absence of social comparison 
information people tend to generate favorable social comparisons. In our studies we 
included conditions of no information, and we find that in many cases negotiators were 
more satisfied with no information than they were with the social comparison information 
we provided. In particular, our results suggest that negotiators are often disappointed to 
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learn about a counterpart’s surplus, even when their counterpart’s surplus is far smaller 
than their own. It is important to note that our studies focused on the effects of social 
comparison, once that information is made available. While our data provide some 
insight into the effects on satisfaction of introducing social comparison information, these 
results largely ignore the question of when and how people seek out this information. 
Clearly, more research is needed to understand how social comparison judgments are 
constructed in natural negotiation contexts. 
 Although the vast majority of negotiation studies focus on the negotiation process 
itself (see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000), post-negotiation behaviors (e.g., 
offers to make amends; Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan, 1999) can have profound effects 
on how negotiation counterparts interact with each other following a negotiation. For 
example, post-negotiation actions may significantly influence a negotiators’ preferences 
for repeated interactions, commitment to a deal, and willingness to cooperate in domains 
not explicitly covered in an agreement (e.g., how hard an employee works following 
contract negotiations). Revealing comparison information can be conceptualized as 
another post negotiation behavior that individuals can use to influence their counterpart’s 
future behavior. Additional work remains to develop our understanding of how social 
comparisons influence both proximal and distant negotiator behavior. 
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Table 1: Models of Satisfaction (Study 2) 
 
Beta Weights 
(Standard Error) Model Type Model Fit 
Objective 
Outcome 
(Objective 
Outcome)2
Partner’s 
Outcome
(Partner’s 
Outcome)2
Expectancy 
Disconfirmation
Social 
Comparison
Buyers’ Models 
Economic 
Utility Model 
Adj. R2=.007 
F(2,67)=1.24 
.349 
(.330) 
-.185 
(.330) 
    
Social Utility 
Model 
Adj. R2=.033 
F(4,65)=1.59 
.370 
(.331) 
-.177 
(.330) 
-.108 
(.357) 
-.129 
(.353) 
  
Expectancy 
Disconfirmation 
Model 
Adj. R2=.089* 
F(2,67)=4.38* 
.111 
(.118) 
   .298* 
(.118) 
 
Social 
Comparison 
Model 
Adj._R2=.228*** 
F(1,68)=21.38*** 
     .489*** 
(.106) 
Combined  
Model 
Adj. R2=.211** 
F(6,63)=4.08** 
.076 
(.314) 
-.109 
(.302) 
-.030 
(.327) 
-.086 
(.321) 
.191 
(.117) 
.401** 
(.134) 
Sellers’ Models 
Economic 
Utility Model 
Adj. R2=.064* 
F(2,71)=3.49* 
.361 
(.473) 
-.064 
(.473) 
    
Social Utility 
Model 
Adj. R2=.136** 
F(4,69)=3.88** 
.380 
(.460) 
-.140 
(.462) 
-.734** 
(.264) 
.613* 
(.257) 
  
Expectancy 
Disconfirmation 
Model 
Adj. R2=.064* 
F(2,71)=3.49* 
.297* 
(.114) 
   .015 
(.114) 
 
Social 
Comparison 
Model 
Adj. R2=.165*** 
F(1,72)=15.44*** 
     .420*** 
(.107) 
Combined  
Model 
Adj. R2=.185** 
F(6,67)=3.76** 
.152 
(.459) 
-.003 
(.451) 
-.564* 
(.266) 
.516 
(.257) 
-.006 
(.108) 
.298* 
(.122) 
*  p < .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 2: Mean Satisfaction Judgments (Study 3) 
 
Internal Social Comparison External Social 
Comparison Downward No Information Upward 
6.63 7.31 3.83 
SD = 1.65 SD = 1.61 SD = 1.97 Downward  (Smaller Surplus) N = 30 N = 29 N = 29 
4.73 5.68 3.10 
SD = 1.89 SD = 2.18 SD = 1.85 No Information 
N = 30 N = 28 N = 30 
4.17 4.41 3.80 
SD = 1.97 SD = 1.78 SD = 2.46 Upward (Greater Surplus) N = 30 N = 29 N = 30 
 
 
Satisfaction Rating (1: Not at all satisfied, 9: Extremely satisfied)
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Table 3: Mean Satisfaction Judgments (Study 4) 
 
Internal Social Comparison External Social 
Comparison Equal Surplus Smaller Surplus No Surplus 
4.54 6.80 7.67 
SD = 1.86 SD = 1.04 SD = 1.65 Downward (Smaller Surplus) N = 24 N = 25 N = 26 
2.77 5.36 6.04 
SD = 1.77 SD = 1.15 SD = 1.62 No information 
N = 26 N = 25 N = 25 
 
Satisfaction Rating (1: Not at all satisfied, 9: Extremely satisfied)
 38
 
Figure 1: Social Comparison Judgment by Social Referent (Study 1) 
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Figure 2: Satisfaction Judgment by Social Referent (Study 1) 
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Figure 3: Satisfaction Judgments (Study 5) 
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